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BOARD OF EDUCATION OF OKLAHOMA CITY V.
DOWELL: A SOLUTION TO PERPETUAL
JUDICIAL SUPERVISION
I. INTRODUCTION
The Judiciary may intervene to alleviate racial discrimination within
public schools only when de jure segregation, as opposed to de facto seg-
regation, is found to exist.' De jure segregation is an intentional separa-
tion of the races caused by "some purposeful governmental activity."2
Any state action having a "segregative purpose and intent" may serve as
the foundation for de jure segregation.3 Such "purposeful" actions may
be taken by a state government based on statute and constitution or by a
school board intentionally maintaining a racially discriminatory system.4
Both of these activities result in purposeful discrimination and are pro-
hibited by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution.5 Because equal protection of the laws is
unconditionally guaranteed to all citizens regardless of their race, educa-
tional segregation is a constitutional violation falling within the jurisdic-
tion of the federal court system.6
All constitutional violation cases based on intentional discrimina-
tion involve a mandatory desegregation process that may be generally
summarized in four steps. The first step in this process is the court's
1. Thomas E. Chandler, The End of School Busing? School Desegregation and the Finding of
Unitary Status, 40 OKLA. L. REv. 519, 528-29 n.66 (1987) (citing Keyes v. School Dist., 413 U.S.
189, 214-17 (1973)).
2. Id. at 529. If the governmental activity has unintentionally caused racial segregation within
a school district, de facto segregation, which is not unconstitutional, is present rather than de jure
segregation. Keyes v. School Dist., 413 U.S. 189, 205-06 (1973) (defining "essential elements of de
jure segregation" as "segregation resulting from intentional state action directed specifically to...
city schools").
3. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 206 n.14. (determinative factor between de facto and de jure segregation
is "segregative purpose" and intent).
4. Id. at 529.
5. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Id.
6. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. (conferring jurisdiction upon the courts by stating that "Itihe
judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority .... ").
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finding of intentional, de jure segregation in a public school system.7 Sec-
ond, the court issues a remedial injunctive order that forces the school
board to implement a desegregation plan within its district to correct the
constitutional violation." The third step, a declaration that "unitary"
status9 has been achieved by the schools, occurs upon the board's full
compliance with the court's decree. Good faith compliance will presum-
ably signify that the violations have been remedied. Accordingly, when
the unlawful activities are deemed corrected, the school system will be
declared "unitary."10 Fourth, after finding "unitary" status, the court
concludes the case and terminates its jurisdiction.I1
This final step of the desegregation process, although appearing
quite simple and straightforward on its face, has been the topic of much
controversy among the courts. 2 The debate revolves around the applica-
ble standard for the dissolution of the desegregation injunctive order.
The major question is whether the injunction is automatically dissolved
when the board achieves "unitary" status within its school system, conse-
quently freeing the board from the court's jurisdictional power of super-
visory control. Adhering to school desegregation precedent, the United
States Supreme Court in Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public
Schools v. Dowell 3 adopted well established principles. The Court re-
solved this much-litigated issue by providing dissolution of injunctive de-
crees when continual good faith compliance with the remedial order
7. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
8. Hugh J. Beard, Jr., The Role of Res Judicata in Recognizing Unitary Status and Terminat-
ing Desegregation Litigation:. A Response to the Structural Injunction, 49 LA. L. REV. 1239, 1241
(1989), This remedial "court order must be tailored to remedy the violation found, and when finally
approved, constitutes res judicata with respect to the remedial sufficiency of every part of the rem-
edy." See also id. at 1251-56.
9. The courts' inconsistent use of the word "unitary" has caused much confusion. No precise
definition of this term appears regularly in desegregation cases. Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City
Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630, 635-36 (1991) (listing various approaches and citing numerous
cases). Generally, "unitary" is used to describe a dual school system that has been brought into
compliance with the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution. Id.
10. See Beard, supra note 8, at 1241 (discussing the three different results occurri'g upon the
achievement of unitary status). See generally id. at 1287-1313.
11. Chandler, supra note 1, at 541. The finding of unitary status only diminishes the remedial
powers of the court rather than automatically causing jurisdiction over the case to be terminated.
The court could terminate jurisdiction or jurisdiction may be retained by the court "to ensure main-
tenance of the unitary system by school board compliance with outstanding orders. .. " Id.
12. See, eg., United States v. Overton, 834 F.2d 1171, 1175 (5th Cir. 1987); Riddick v. School
Bd. of Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521, 533-34 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986); Vaughns v.
Board of Educ. of Prince George's County, 758 F.2d 983, 988 (4th Cir. 1985); NAACP v. Georgia,
775 F.2d 1403, 1413-14 (11th Cir. 1985); Milliken v. Bradley [Milliken II], 433 U.S. 267, 280-82
(1977); Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 611 F.2d 1239, 1245 (9th Cir. 1979); United States
v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953).
13. 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991).
[Vol. 27:85
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eliminates, to the extent practicable, all vestiges of past de jure discrimi-
nation with respect to every facet of school operations."4 The Dowell
standard requires only the eradication of effects caused by intentional
discrimination, but permits the existence of unintentional racial segrega-
tion when such segregation is due to private actions beyond a school
board's control. Unintentional racial segregation is permitted even
when one-race schools reappear subsequent to the unitary finding.
. II. HISTORY OF OKLAHOMA SEGREGATION
Before explaining the alternate standards employed by the courts to
dissolve a desegregation injunction, a brief history of segregation in the
state of Oklahoma needs to be explored. Southern states commonly sub-
scribed to "Jim Crow" laws which required a complete and absolute sep-
aration of the races.15 Such laws, demanding compulsory racial
separation, were based on centuries-old customs and traditions of the
South dating back to the slavery era. Oklahoma formally adopted these
southern traditions into both its constitutional and statutory laws.16 As a
result, from the inception of Oklahoma's statehood in 1907, school dis-
tricts were entirely segregated while operating under a "separate-but-
equal" doctrine which presumably provided identical accommodations
to children of all races.1 7 Thus, pursuant to Oklahoma law,18 the opera-
tion of racially intermingled institutions was unlawful and imposed crim-
inal liability upon persons implementing and maintaining such
facilities. 9 Not only were school operators held criminally liable for
conducting racially-mixed forbidden activities, but students and teachers
were also subject to criminal prosecution and penalties.2'
In addition to creating a mandatory segregation system within the
14. Id. at 638.
15. Dowell v. School Bd. of Oklahoma City Pub. Sch., 219 F. Supp. 427, 431 (W.D. Okla.
1963). See Chandler, supra note 1, at 523 nn. 26-27 for citations to constitutions and statutes of
southern states which incorporated mandatory racial separation into their laws. See also Wiley A.
Branton, The History and Future of School Desegregation, 31 Educ. L. Rep. 1075 (1986) (manner in
which racial segregation became an "institutionalized" custom and practice in many other areas of
the country as well as in the original southern states).
16. OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 5; OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 3 ("Separate schools for white and
colored children... shall be provided by the Legislature ...."); Oklahoma School Code, ch. 1A,
1949 Okla. Sess. Laws 532, 536-37 (repealed 1953).
17. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (United States Supreme Court recognized ra-
cial equality but failed to abolish the deep-rooted discriminatory policies which created vivid distinc-
tions between the two races and kept them from intermingling).
18. See supra note 16.
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public schools, a state's adoption of "separate-but-equal" laws concur-
rently manipulated residential housing demographics. 21 The residential
demographic patterns of the Caucasian and Negro people were largely
governed by restrictive covenants placed upon the lands by developers
pursuant to the "separate-but-equal" laws that prohibited the sale of lots
to persons of the Negro race.22 In 1954, these segregative practices and
all other discriminatory policies, such as Oklahoma City's scheme of
mandated racism, were declared unconstitutional and unenforceable in
the landmark case, Brown v. Board of Education.23 Thus, after the Brown
decision, the Oklahoma City school board was not only forced to con-
front the monumental task of desegregating the public school system but
additionally had to overcome a fifty-year vested tradition of race separa-
tion.2" The difficulty of this task was due to the fact that "[t]he Negro
people had been segregated so completely in their residential pattern that
it was difficult to determine what way, method and plan would be first
adopted and carried out and what progressive plans should be adopted
and carried out in the future. '25
III. HISTORY OF DOWELL
A. Operation of a Dual System
In the midst of the most turbulent years of the civil rights move-
ment, Robert Dowell brought a class action suit in 1961 against the
school board of Oklahoma City public schools seeking injunctive relief
that would restrain school officials from operating "a dual, biracial sys-
tem of racially segregated schools."'26 Dowell was a Negro student who,
while attending a public school in the Oklahoma City system, sought to
protect his equal protection rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution 27 and Title 42 sections 198128 and
21. Dowell, 219 F. Supp. at 433.
22. Id. ("[I]t was generally the practice of the developers to provide in the plats restrictive
covenants on lands used for new homes or dwelling places, prohibiting the sale of lands or lots or the
ownership by persons of the Negro race.").
23. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
24. Dowell, 219 F. Supp. at 434. See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Desegregation
Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 424 (1960) (discussing the minority plight which leads the black race to
continual confinement within a discriminatory system founded for the very purpose of keeping mi-
norities inferior to whites); Donald E. Lively, The Effectuation and Maintenance of Integrated
SchooL Modern Problems in a Post-Desegregation Society, 48 OHIo ST. L.J. 117, 125 (1987)
("[c]ultural conditioning produces stereotypes that influence decisions and foster separatism.").
25. Dowell, 219 F. Supp. at 434.
26. Id. at 428.
27. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988) provides in part:
[Vol. 27:85
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198329 of the United States Code. Dowell also asserted that certain pro-
visions in both Oklahoma's Constitution and statutes were unconstitu-
tionally applied by the school board with respect to the Negro race.3
The foundation of Dowel's action involved the board's operation of
a discriminatory transfer policy, commonly referred to as "minority to
majority." This policy allegedly created a non-integration environment
in the school district3 by allowing students to transfer from a school
where their race represented the minority of students to a school where
their race was the majority. 2 There was inequality in the transfer policy,
because the Negro students were burdened with specific requirements
and limitations that were not placed on Caucasian students who sought
identical transfers within the same school district.33
In addition to the transfer policy, Dowell also submitted evidence of
substantial well-developed patterns of the board's purposeful conduct
that demonstrated racial discrimination within the school system. 4 The
evidence established patterns indicating that: (1) the assignments of
faculty and staff members were based solely on race; (2) a disproportion-
ate number of Negro pupils in one attendance area caused student bodies
to become completely segregated; and (3) no prospective plans requiring
future racial integration in the district had been adopted by the
Oklahoma City school board of education.3" These patterns of discrimi-
nation revealed the board's "practice of nonintegration" which was alleg-
edly an attempt to remedy the discontent felt by blacks attending
predominantly white schools. 36 Thus, no future plans for integration had
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every
State and Territory to... the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment... and to no other.
Id.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) provides in part: "Every person who... subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured .... Id.
30. Dowell, 219 F. Supp. at 428.
31. Id. at 429-30.
32. Id. at 440.
33. Id. at 429-30, 435-39. To justify a transfer to a better school, Robert Dowell was scholasti-
cally discouraged because the school board required him to take more difficult electronics courses
offered at the predominantly white school that were not available at his present school. However,
white transfer students were not required to enroll in any special courses before being permitted to
transfer to this same school.
34. Id. at 430.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 440.
1991]
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been developed because the board administered its discriminatory poli-
cies based on the premise that the student transfer procedures were de-
veloped to favor the best interest of the students individually and the
public school system in its entirety.37
In 1963, the United States District Court determined that the
Oklahoma City school board was still operating under the same policies
that were in effect prior to the Brown decision.3" Holding that these
policies were specifically "designed to perpetuate and encourage segrega-
tion,"' 39 the trial court found that the board had failed to implement new
non-discriminatory policies as mandated by the United States Supreme
Court in Brown.4' The continuation of an intentional dual school system
equals de jure segregation, triggering the need for the desegregation pro-
cess and necessitating the second step, the issuance of a remedial injunc-
tive order. Thus, after discovering such intentional segregation in
Oklahoma City, the court ordered the board of education to permanently
discard its "minority to majority" student transfer policy and to quickly
devise a comprehensive integration plan.41
B. Segregation Remedy
Attempting to comply with this order, the board submitted a "Pol-
icy Statement" to the court in January of 1964.42 However, the court
concluded that this "new policy" was merely an alteration of the existing
transfer procedure and a neighborhood rezoning program, rather than a
plan to desegregate.43 In evaluating the board's desegregation attempt,
the court focused on the transfer and rezoning policies which were inca-
pable of producing an integrated system.44
37. Id.
38. Id. at 441 (referring to Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
39. Id.
40. Id. (referring to Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
41. Id. See iL at 447-48 for original language in the court's decree ordering the school board
to establish and submit a comprehensive integration plan, within 90 days, accompanied by all perti-
nent information used by the board in the adoption of such a plan.
42. Dowell v. School Bd. of Oklahoma City Pub. Sch., 244 F. Supp. 971, 972 (W.D. Okla.
1965), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 931 (1967). The school board submitted the "Policy Statement Regard-
ing Integration of the Oklahoma City Public Schools" so that the court could determine whether the
new policy adequately conformed to the orders given by the court in 1963. Id. at 972-73.
43. Id. at 976-77. "The essential or most important point is that defendants have never pre-
pared a plan by which progress in the desegregation process could be accurately judged .... The
plan submitted... is not a plan, but a statement of policy." Id. at 976.
44. Id. The court pointed out that the success of the board's desegregation plan could not be
determined due to the indefinite nature of the submitted policy. "Desegregation ... requires a
definite and positive plan providing definable and ascertainable goals to be achieved within a definite
time according to a prepared procedure and with responsibilities clearly designated." Regarding the
[Vol. 27:85
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The adoption of a suspicious new "special" transfer policy allowed
white students to transfer into all white or predominantly white schools
and out of their assigned schools if the assigned schools were either ra-
cially integrated or predominantly Negro, making possible the continua-
tion of purposeful racial segregation.45 The new "special" transfer policy
unquestionably hindered the abolishment of public school segregation
and continued the judicially invalidated "minority to majority" transfer
rule.4
6
The court also criticized the rezoning aspect of the board's new pol-
icy. Although the board claimed that the rezoning of school districts was
founded on residence and not on race,47 the board's utilization of estab-
lished residential segregation in the rezoned districts not only reinforced
the existing racial segregation but even expanded it to the extent of de-
stroying previously integrated areas.48 Because this neighborhood zon-
ing plan was based on "logically consistent geographical areas" initiated
by state laws, restrictive covenants, and economic discrimination which
prevented Negroes from living among Caucasians, the court found that
the rezoning created an even more intensified separation of the races.49
After reviewing the board's policies, the court concluded that the
board "failed to desegregate the public schools in a manner so as to elimi-
nate either the tangible elements of the segregated system, or the viola-
tion of the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and the members of their
adequacy of the policy statement, the court concluded that the board's "failure to adopt an affirma-
tive policy is itself a policy, adherence to which, at least in this case, has slowed up-in some cases-
reversed the desegregation process." Id. at 975.
45. Id. at 974-77. Because the school board allowed whites to separate themselves from other
races, the "new" policy was merely a disguised continuation of the original unconstitutional transfer
policy.
46. Id. at 974. See Dowell v. School Bd. of Oklahoma City Pub. Sch., 219 F. Supp. 427, 442
(W.D. Okla. 1963) (ordering the Oklahoma City school board "to cease and desist its policy of
minority to majority, or transfer of students from one school to another school .... ). See also Goss
v. Board of Educ. of Knoxville, 373 U.S. 683, 687 (1963) ("Classifications based on race for purposes
of transfers between public schools . . . violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.").
47. Dowell v. School Bd. of Oklahoma City Pub. Sch., 244 F. Supp. 971, 976 (W.D. Okla.
1965). The court stated that the board was adhering to a policy founded on geographical areas
which "when superimposed over already existing residential segregation initiated by law... leads
inexorably to continued school segregation." Id. Thus, the school board's method of drawing school
boundary lines without giving consideration to pre-existing residential housing patterns constituted a
continuance of "the very segregation which necessitated the rezoning action, and requires judicial
condemnation of the procedure." Id. at 980 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)).
48. See id. at 976-77. See supra text accompanying note 47.
49. See id. at 975-77 for factors analyzed by the court in its determination that the Negro race
had virtually no freedom in choosing the housing areas in which they lived due to intense discrimina-
tion against them.
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class, enumerated in the Brown decision."50 Thus, rather than effectively
remedying the constitutional violations found by the court in 1963, the
new policy merely preserved and enhanced the inequalities suffered by
the minority races.
To alleviate these racial inequalities, the issuance of a new remedial
order became imperative. The policy implemented by the board was to-
tally ineffective in converting the Oklahoma City dual system into a uni-
tary system, and the board offered no other alternate course of action.
Thus, the court issued a new order specifically mandating use of the Fin-
ger Plan, which required a restructuring of school attendance zones
while employing a reasonable busing scheme."1
The court formally entered this new injunctive decree in 1972 after
considering three different proposed plans for desegregating the
Oklahoma City public schools.5 2 This decree ordered the school board
to adopt the Finger Plan unification proposal submitted by the plaintiffs
and prepared by an integration expert, Dr. John A. Finger.13 Utilization
of Finger's busing program was a plausible alternative to the board's es-
tablished plan because the Supreme Court held in Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education 54 that "[t]ransportation is a permissive
tool for achieving integration."55 The court reasoned that the Finger
Plan, if faithfully adopted and implemented, would create a unitary sys-
tem eventually leading to both blacks and whites being present in every
50. Id. at 976 (referring to Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). By failing to eradi-
cate segregation in the public school system, the board's actions, or inactions, constituted a tremen-
dous disservice to desegregation efforts and the plight of the non-white races by trapping these
people in confined geographical areas providing no opportunity for racial integration. Id.
51. Dowell v. Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City Pub. Sch., 338 F. Supp. 1256, 1273 (W.D.
Okla. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1041 (1972). In allowing the school board to continue its policy,
the court determined it had misplaced its reliance on the "good faith of the board" to convert the
system into one with a unitary status. The policy implemented by the board was not capable of
changing the racial identity of even a single school. Id. at 1264-65.
52. Id. at 1259-68. The three proposed plans were: (1) "Current Plan," a type of "freedom of
choice" plan allowing a student to choose the school he wanted to attend by manipulating his course
of study. The court held that this plan cleared a path for resegregation and was utterly impotent as a
method of achieving unitary status; (2) "Consultants' Plan" providing "inter-racial exchange exper-
iences" for all students which the court found to be neither feasible nor workable; and (3) "Finger
Plan" that incorporated a restructuring and busing scheme within the school zones so that each
school would have both black and white children in attendance. Id.
53. Id. at 1259. Dr. Finger was an education professor at Rhode Island State University spe-
cializing in desegregation and integration. The court stipulated that strict commitment and compli-
ance to the principles of the Finger Plan was mandatory but the details were to be considered
flexible. Id at 1273.
54. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
55. Dowell, 338 F. Supp. at 1272 (citation omitted).
[Vol. 27:85
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school.5 6 Additionally, continuous jurisdiction was retained by the dis-
trict court "until it [was] clear that disestablishment of the dual system
[was] complete.15 7
C. Termination of the Case and Jurisdiction
In complying with the 1972 mandatory remedial order, the
Oklahoma City school board completed the third phase of the integra-
tion process by dismantling its dual school system. Consequently, upon
eliminating "all vestiges of state-imposed racial discrimination" and thus
achieving unitary status, the school board moved to close the case in
1975.58 After conducting a hearing to determine if the Finger Plan had
accomplished its objective, the court, in 1977, took the final step of the
integration process by terminating the case as well as relinquishing juris-
diction and supervision over the matter.59 The court granted the school
board's motion to terminate the case after finding that: (1) the board
properly complied with the Finger Plan; (2) the board did not intend to
dismantle the presently implemented plan; (3) unitary status was
achieved within the school district; and (4) the attained unitary system
would not be affected by termination of active court supervision.'
This 1977 order, although issued to terminate the case, failed to va-
cate or modify the injunctive desegregation decree ordered in 1972 re-
quiring implementation of the Finger Plan.6 Thus, the 1972 mandatory
injunction was still effective and binding even after the court found that a
unitary system had been attained and relinquished its jurisdiction.
In 1984, the board discontinued the Finger Plan in favor of a new
plan, the "Student Reassignment Plan," which was designed to eliminate
compulsory busing of black elementary students to schools outside their
immediate neighborhood.62 Under the Student Reassignment Plan, a
56. Id. at 1271.
57. Id.
58. Dowell v. Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City Pub. Sch., 606 F. Supp. 1548, 1551 (referring
to Dowell v. School Bd. of Oklahoma City Pub. Sch., No. Civ. 9452, slip op. (W.D. Okla. Jan. 18,
1977)).
59. Id.
60. Id. (quoting Dowell, No. Civ. 9452, slip op. (W.D. Okla. Jan. 18, 1977)). Additionally, the
1977 order terminating the case stated that since the board was "[n]ow sensitized to the constitu-
tional implications of its conduct and with a new awareness of its responsibility to citizens of all
races, the Board is entitled to pursue in good faith its legitimate policies without the continuing
constitutional supervision of this Court .... Id.
61. See Dowell v. Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City Pub. Sch., 795 F.2d 1516, 1518 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986).
62. See Dowell, 606 F. Supp. at 1552-53 for fundamental elements of the Student Reassignment
Plan which was to become effective in the 1985-86 school year.
1991]
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"majority to minority" transfer policy offered state-provided transporta-
tion, allowing elementary school children to transfer to a school where
their race was the minority representation.63 No alterations of the school
boundaries or the demographic patterns were made by the school board
to intentionally create any particular racially identifiable schools
although eleven of the sixty-four elementary schools in Oklahoma City
remained virtually all black after implementing the new plan." The
court found the Student Reassignment Plan to be "educationally sound"
and constitutional because the plan was primarily drafted to alleviate the
busing burdens imposed on young children and to accommodate shifting
residential housing patterns.65
Dowell moved to reopen the case in 1985 to challenge the validity of
the board's new plan and the unitary status of the system.66 Upon verify-
ing the constitutionality of the plan, the district court refused to reopen
the case, reasoning that Dowell was collaterally estopped from relitigat-
ing these issues because "all indicia of 'unitariness'" were present in the
Oklahoma City School District and had been present ever since the 1977
declaration of unitary status.67 Additionally, the court concluded as a
matter of law that "[t]he existence of racially identifiable schools is not
unconstitutional without a showing that such schools were created for
the purpose of discriminating on the basis of race."'68 No such showing
of discriminatory intent was proven in the 1985 Dowell case. 69
Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dis-
trict court decision, holding that Dowell, as representative for all the
black class-action plaintiffs, could bring forth challenges concerning the
plan and status maintained in the school system.70 After pointing out
63. Id. at 1552. It is important to note that this transfer policy was not the same policy previ-
ously declared unconstitutional by the court. The unconstitutional transfer scheme was called the
"minority to majority" policy which permitted transfers achieving the exact opposite result as that
achieved under the "majority to minority" policy discussed here.
64. Id. at 1553-54. An order demanding desegregation does not require every school in the
district to be racially integrated in its entirety. A constitutional violation arising out of practicing
segregation by law will not be found merely because some one-race schools exist within the system.
See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 24-26 (1971).
65. Dowell, 606 F. Supp. at 1553-54.
66. Id. at 1549-50.
67. Id. at 1555.
68. Id. at 1556 (citing Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973)).
69. Id. "[O]fficial action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially
disproportionate impact." Id. (citing Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 264-65 (1977)).
70. Dowell v. Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City Pub. Sch., 795 F.2d 1516, 1519 (10th Cir.
1986). Note that the court confined its holding to the issue concerning the plaintiffs' right to reopen
the case. Id. at 1523.
[Vol. 27:85
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that, pursuant to the 1972 remedial injunctive decree, no deviation from
the Finger Plan was to be permitted unless court approval had been pre-
viously obtained by the board,7 1 the Court of Appeals held that the
board's abandonment of the Finger Plan and implementation of the Stu-
dent Reassignment Plan constituted a basis of relief for the black plain-
tiffs. 72 The court opined that because the board independently and
significantly revised the original desegregation plan, the plaintiffs, as ben-
eficiaries of the initial plan, had the right to challenge such unapproved
changes by seeking to enforce the injunction, without having to prove
discriminatory motive or intent on behalf of the board.7 3
Based on this reasoning, the board would be free from challenges
and regain total independence from the 1972 decree only if the 1977 or-
der terminating active court supervision further dissolved the mandatory
injunction at that same time.74 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that, because
the district court failed to specifically dissolve its decree, the court's en-
forcement powers were not abolished in any respect and the board was
not relieved of its duty under the injunctive order to continue to remedy
all traces of segregation found in the Oklahoma City schools.75 In other
words, the 1972 injunctive order "survive[d] beyond the procedural life
of the litigation" and remained within the district court's continuing
jurisdiction.76
D. Dissolution of the Injunction
In 1987, the district court on remand dissolved its desegregation de-
cree finding that no action taken by the board caused the current separa-
tion of the races found within residential housing areas.77 Addressing
71. Id. at 1522 (citing Dowell v. Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City Pub. Sch., 338 F. Supp.
1256, 1273 (W.D. Okla. (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1041 (1972)).
72. Id. at 1522-23.
73. Id. at 1519. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit also held that "a past
finding of unitariness, by itself, does not bar renewed litigation upon a mandatory injunction." Id.
74. Id. at 1520-21.
75. Id. at 1520. The court found the theory espoused in the amicus brief of the government to
be without merit. The government took the position that a finding of unitariness will return all
authority over the operations of the school district back to the board of education causing the disso-
lution of all previously governing court orders. Id.
76. Id. at 1521 (citing EEOC v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 611 F.2d 795 (10th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 952 (1980)). The "binding nature of a mandatory injunction is recognized in school
desegregation cases." Id. (citing Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 439 (1976)).
77. Dowell v. Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City Pub. Sch., 677 F. Supp. 1503, 1512 (W.D.
Okla. 1987), vacated, 890 F.2d 1483 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1521 (1990), rev'd, 111
S. Ct. 630 (1991). Since the past illegal discrimination had been substantially eliminated and the




Widdig: Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell: A Solution to Perp
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1991
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
the actual cause of residential segregation in Oklahoma City, the court
acknowledged that a substantial number of blacks had migrated from the
predominantly black eastern inner-city area into all the other parts of the
school district.78  However, despite this vast black migration into
predominantly white neighborhoods, the east inner-city area, although
now less populated, still remained almost entirely black.79
Rather than attributing these demographic changes to school board
action, the court decided the continuation of racial separation was due to
housing "affordability," socioeconomic status, the personal preferences
of races to live amongst themselves, and private discriminatory actions.80
The differing economic status of the races was determined to be the con-
tributing factor of at least thirty percent and possibly as much as seventy
percent of the racial segregation persisting in America even after desegre-
gation efforts are complete.81
After examining these substantial inadvertent changes in housing
conditions, the court held that the original Finger Plan, which called for
a contemporaneous increase in the busing burdens placed on young black
children with the occurrence of such demographic variations, rendered
itself unworkable,82 thus warranting dissolution of the 1972 injunctive
decree.83 Furthermore, in accordance with its 1985 decision,8 4 the dis-
trict court again concluded the school board was not motivated by dis-
criminatory objectives in its adoption of the new Student Reassignment
Plan.
78. Id. at 1507. As a result of the black migratory pattern, all attendance areas comprising the
Oklahoma City school district now had black residents.
79. Id. at 1512.
80. Id. at 1511-12. Research indicates that white families prefer living only where representa-
tion of blacks is relatively small (0-30%) and if the percentage reaches the upper limit, whites will
move. In contrast, black families, although tending to also prefer their own race, will remain and
move into areas containing a high representation of whites (50% or greater) (citing Defendant exhib-
its). Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1514-15. The busing burdens imposed upon young black children increased due to
longer amounts of time necessary to travel to properly assigned schools needing their minority repre-
sentation. Dr. Finger, the draftsman of the Finger Plan, even testified that his plan would not be
effective forever and that reformations were definitely required in light of the demographic changes
occurring in the city. Id.
83. Id at 1512. The decree was neither required nor effective to combat the residual segrega-
tion in Oklahoma City because "[n]o court is equipped with the judicial power or machinery neces-
sary to eradicate residential segregation. This phenomenon develops even in the midst of court
ordered desegregation." Id.
84. See Dowell v. Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City Pub. Sch., 338 F. Supp. 1256, 1271 (W.D.
Okla.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1041 (1972).
85. Dowell v. Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City Pub. Sch., 677 F. Supp. 1503, 1516 (W.D.
Okla 1987), vacated, 890 F.2d 1483 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1521 (1990), rev'd, 111
[Vol. 27:85
12
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 27 [1991], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol27/iss1/5
BOARD OF EDUCATION v. DOWELL
Explaining the true intention of its 1977 order which terminated the
case, the court conceded that the injunction should have been dissolved
at that time in order to restore the school board's total independence.8 6
After hearing this case for more than twenty-five years, the district court
concluded that the objectives of the injunction had been fully achieved. 7
Achieving the injunction's purposes justified returning total control over
the Oklahoma City school system to its board of education because judi-
cial regulatory control was not intended to stay in effect beyond the time
necessary to cure intentional segregation.88
Not surprisingly, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's
decision once more and remanded the case for modification, rather than
dissolution, of the desegregation decree.89 Adhering to the standard ini-
tially pronounced in United States v. Swift & Co.,' which requires "a
clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen condi-
tions" 91 to justify dissolution, the Tenth Circuit placed the burden of
proof upon the board to establish the presence of unforeseen substantial
changes in conditions that rendered the decree ineffective and unduly
burdensome. 92 The board alleged that changing racial residential pat-
terns constituted the new and unforeseen conditions that made the origi-
nal decree onerous.93 The appellate court focused on whether the
Student Reassignment Plan either solved or was capable of solving the
new problems presented by the substantial demographic changes in the
school district.94 Finding the Finger Plan incapable of solving such
problems, the court alleged that the Plan actually "restore[d] the effects
of past discriminatory intent remedied by the decree by recreating ra-
cially identifiable elementary schools, overlooking school capacity
S. Ct. 630 (1991) (board proved by a preponderance of the evidence that its plan lacked a racially
discriminatory design).
86. Id. at 1506.
87. Id. at 1526 (citing Milliken v. Bradley [Milliken II], 433 U.S. 267, 280-82 (1977)). In dis-
solving the desegregation decree, the court found the following factors determinative: (1) absence of
present "vestiges of the past intentional discrimination"; (2) reoccurrence of de jure segregation was
not anticipated; and (3) full achievement of the objectives of this case. Id.
88. Id.
89. Dowell v. Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City Pub. Sch., 890 F.2d 1483, 1486 (10th Cir.
1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991).
90. 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
91. Id. at 119.
92. Dowell, 890 F.2d at 1490-91. In other words, the board must show, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the racially discriminatory conditions which initiated the original injunction are no
longer present, or that the unconstitutional conditions have been eliminated and that the new plan
"maintains the continuing prospective effect of the decree." Id. at 1498.
93. Id. at 1493.
94. Id. at 1504.
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problems, and failing to address faculty imbalance. ' '9 5
In response to this decision, the school board's petition for writ of
certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court of the United States so that
the dispute arising among the appellate courts regarding the appropriate
standard to apply in a case such as Dowell could finally be resolved.96 On
January 15, 1991, the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit and
remanded the case back to the district court on the ground that the ap-
propriate standard applicable to public school desegregation injunctions
is not found in the Swift decision.97
The Court reasoned that because the Swift facts are not analogous to
those in Dowell, a general application of the strict Swift standard to this
case was inappropriate. 98 The unique facts present in desegregation cases
and absent from Swift require special consideration by the Court with
respect to the intentional conduct of the school board, the importance of
local autonomy, the effect of achieving unitary status, and the accom-
plishment of remedial objectives.99 Thus, in racial discrimination situa-
tions such as Dowell, where an evaluation of all these issues is crucial,
any reliance on the Swift standard is misplaced,.l" The remainder of this
article will focus on the Supreme Court's rationale for the Dowell deci-
sion, examining the reasons the Swift standard is inapplicable to desegre-
gation cases and the appropriateness of the governing standard espoused
by the Court for the dissolution of a remedial injunction.
VI. ANALYSIS: RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTING STANDARDS FOR
DISSOLUTION OF REMEDIAL INJUNCTIONS
A. Considerations Unique to Desegregation
The most important considerations unique to desegregation cases
are the need to protect the independence of local school boards, the diffi-
culty of defining unitary status and measuring its effect on a board's con-
tinuing obligations, and the complexities surrounding the appropriate
95. Id. The court noted that, as a result of implementing the Plan, half of the Oklahoma City
elementary schools returned to being one-race majority schools. Id. at 1502.
96. Board of Edue. of Oklahoma City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630, 635 (1991) (citing
Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 110 S. Ct. 1521 (1990)).
97. Id. at 637-38.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 637. The Swift standard was developed in the context of unlawful restraints on trade
or "covenants not to compete" rather than in the context of public school desegregation. Id. at 636-
37.
100. Id. at 636.
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remedial objectives of court ordered desegregation injunctions.1 °"
1. The Importance of Local Autonomy
In order to dispel racial discrimination in public schools, a court
may issue a mandatory injunctive decree that requires adherence to spe-
cific remedial conduct as was done in Dowel. 1 2 However, such an in-
junction is intended to be only a temporary0 3 solution and is not
expected to perpetually govern the actions of the board."° Upon achiev-
ing the objectives of the compulsory remedy by faithfully complying with
the order imposed on school officials, the Supreme Court held that disso-
lution of the injunctive decree is warranted.1 0 5
An important justification considered by the Dowell Court concerns
the concept of respecting local autonomy.10 6 Dissolution of the injunc-
tion allows local administrators to ultimately regain control over their
school system.10 7 Reasoning that the principal responsibility of provid-
ing equally competent education for all students falls on local authorities,
the Court recognized the importance of permitting officials to manage
school affairs and solve educational problems. 108 To achieve this end, the
Dowell Court held that:
[d]issolving a desegregation decree after the local authorities have op-
erated in compliance with it for a reasonable period of time properly
101, Id. at 637.
102. See Beard, supra note 8, at 1241. Once a court finds intentional segregation it must issue a
remedial injunction which will eradicate all previous constitutional violations.
103. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 637 (judicial supervision of local public school systems was always
intended to be a temporary remedial measure). The Court also notes that the desegregation process
was to be immediately implemented proceeding "with all deliberate speed." Id. (citing Brown v.
Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299-301 (1955)).
104. See, e.g., id. (recognizing the difference between the perpetual enforceability of the Swift
decree and the injunction ordered in Dowell which was intentionally temporary in nature); Pasadena
City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 436 (1976) (school board could not be required to
continually rearrange its attendance zones in an effort to perpetuate the specific racial balance de-
sired by the district court).
105. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 637-38. Although the school board urged the Supreme Court to dis-
solve the injunction according to a previous district court decision, the Court remanded the case so
that the district court could apply the appropriate standard and decide if the school board made a
sufficient showing of good faith compliance with the decree. Id.
106. Id. at 637 (citations omitted) (reasoning that local control permits citizens to participate in
making educational decisions and produces school programs that satisfy local needs).
107. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 410 (1977) (citations omitted) ("local
autonomy of school districts is a vital national tradition"); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County
Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 778 F.2d 404, 434 (8th Cir. 1985), cerL denied, 476 U.S. 1186 (1986)
(school districts have an important interest in the management of their own affairs); United States v.
Board of Sch. Comm'rs of Indianapolis, 637 F.2d 1101, 1114 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838
(1980) (court order remedying segregation must strive to appreciate local autonomy).
108. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 637.
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recognizes that "necessary concern for the important values of local
control of public school systems dictates that a federal court's regula-
tory control of such systems not extend beyond the time required to
remedy the effects of past intentional discrimination."' 109
In rejecting the Swift test as excessively stringent, the Court, with-
out elaboration, concluded that the Swift standard would entail indefinite
judicial supervision, producing "Draconian" ramifications that are not
constitutionally required.'10 Even though the Court's rationale was less
than concise, a conclusive decision was made regarding the governing
standard and its goal of restoring local independence."'
2. The Effect of Achieving Unitary Status
Another aspect of the Supreme Court's decision in Dowell concerns
the achievement of unitary status and its effect on the life of an injunc-
tion. The Court pronounced in Pasadena City Board of Education v.
Spangler112 that the school board is entitled to a definitive statement
from the lower court indicating the significance of its unitary finding and
the intended results of the desegregation injunction.' '3 The obligations
of the board remain hopelessly uncertain in the absence of such guide-
lines. However, the 1977 court order terminating the Dowell case failed
to pronounce the district court's meaning of the word "unitary" and the
corresponding effect 'of a unitary finding." 4 Without any guidance from
the court, the obligations of the Oklahoma City school board remained
undefined.
The difficulty in defining "unitary" is that each desegregation case
must be resolved in light of its own particular facts; no precise formula
can be routinely applied to all school systems.' Nevertheless, the
Dowell court found guidelines in Green v. County School Board.'1 6 In
Green, the Supreme Court defined desegregation goals as the conversion
of a dual system into a unitary one, and indicated six areas that must be
109. Id. (quoting Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 611 F.2d at 1245 n.5 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) which cites Milliken v. Bradley [Milliken II], 433 U.S. 267, 280-82 (1977)).
110. Id. at 638.
111. Id. at 637-38.
112. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
113. Id. at 438-39.
114. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 636.
115. See Chandler, supra note 1, at 535 n.100 (citing Note, Allocating the Burden of Proof After a
Finding of Unitariness in School Desegregation Litigation, 100 HARV. L. REv. 653, 662-63 (1987)).
116. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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integrated in order for a school system to achieve unitary status. 117
These six prerequisites concern the integration of the students, instruc-
tors, staff members, extracurricular activities, facilities, and transporta-
tion. 1 8 Only upon freeing every one of these elements from the shadows
of state-promoted racial segregation may a school system attain unitary
status. 1
19
After recognizing the capricious use of the word "unitary" and
questioning the usefulness of determining a more precise definition, the
Court concluded that "unitary" refers to a "school district that has com-
pletely remedied all vestiges of past discrimination," as far as practicable,
satisfying the mandate of Brown 120 and complying with the command of
the Constitution. Because the Green unitariness guidelines evaluate the
most crucial indicia of an integrated system, the Supreme Court ordered
the District Court to use these principles on remand to determine
whether dissolution of the injunction was warranted.121 For dissolution,
the remedial objectives of the decree had to be deemed satisfied.
3. Appropriate Remedial Objectives
Only a constitutional violation will invoke the power of a federal
court to reorganize the operation of local and state governmental enti-
ties. 122 In order to provide the constitutionally guaranteed equal protec-
tion of the laws, 23 all vestiges of state-imposed segregation must be
promptly eradicated."12 Thus, the broad remedial objective of a
mandatory integration order is "to restore, as nearly as possible, the vic-
tims of discrimination to the position they would have occupied in the
117. Dowell, 111. S. Ct. at 638 (citing Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S.
at 435).
118. Green, 391 U.S. at 435.
119. Dowell, II S. Ct. at 638 (citing Green, 391 U.S. at 435, and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklen-
burg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 18 (1971)). See also Riddick v. School Bd. of Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521,
533 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986) ("All aspects of public education must be freed from
the vestiges of state sanctioned racial segregation before a school system becomes unitary.").
120. Dowell, 111 S. CL at 635-36 (citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955)). See
Riddick, 784 F.2d at 532-33. "Under the mandate of Brown, '[s]chool boards ... then operating
state-compelled dual systems were... clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever
steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be
eliminated root and branch.'" (quoting Green, 391 U.S. at 437-38).
121. See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 438-39 (1976).
122. See supra notes 1 and 6. See also Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 419-20
(1977).
123. See supra notes 5 and 6 and accompanying text.
124. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (requiring the remedy to be imple-
mented "with all deliberate speed"). See also Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S.
19, 20 (per curiam), reh'g denied, 396 U.S. 976 (1969) (requiring unconstitutional school system to
be changed at once).
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absence of illegal conduct."' 25 Achieving integration with respect to
every critical element of a school system, such as those specified in
Green,'2 6 remedies the prior intentional constitutional violations and
leads to a pronouncement of unitary status. Such a pronouncement indi-
cates that the purposes of the injunctive order have been fulfilled and that
no further judicial intervention is warranted absent a subsequent showing
of intentional resegregation.
In delineating appropriate remedial objectives, the court must take
into consideration the fact that certain vestiges of segregation are not
curable by judicial supervision. 127 For instance, people exercising their
individual freedom to change their residence or send their children to
private schools cannot constitutionally be hindered by a court ordering
them to make endless attempts to totally integrate.' 28
Accordingly, the school board should not be required to accomplish
any broad purpose which lies beyond the control of educational authori-
ties.129 The only affirmative duty perpetually imposed on local authori-
ties is to not "take any action that would reinstitute a dual school system
or discriminate against any child on the basis of race."' 30 Since the court
ordered objective is to eliminate all traces of purposeful segregation in
public schools, a board that has achieved unitary status has no continu-
ing duty to alter racial separation found to exist in residential areas due
solely to economics and private, individual preferences. 3 1 Once deter-
mined, a unitary finding is not affected by post-desegregation demo-
graphic changes for which school authorities bear no responsibility.'3 2
Thus, "[o]nce a system becomes unitary, school officials need not make
125. Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 611 F.2d 1239, 1241 (1979).
126. See supra notes 116-119 and accompanying text.
127. See Beard, supra note 8, at 1250 (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. I, 22 (1971)).
128. See id. at 1249-51. "The preclusion or reduction of 'white flight' . . . is not a legitimate
governmental objective .... Id. at 1249 (citing United States v. Scotland Neck Bd. of Educ., 407
U.S. 484, 490-91 (1972)).
129. Id. at 1250 (quoting Swann, 402 U.S. at 22).
130. Chandler, supra note I, at 542 (explaining that school boards generally operate their sys-
tems, after a unitary finding, as though there never had been unconstitutional intentional segregation
in the district).
131. Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 721 F.2d 1425 (5th Cir. 1983). "Changes in
neighborhood ethnicity taking place after school officials have transformed the system into a unitary
one need not be remedied .... for school officials are under no duty to adjust for the purely private
acts of those who choose to vote with their feet." Id. at 1435 (citing Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v.
Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 435-37 (1976)).
132. See Ross v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 699 F.2d 218, 225 (5th Cir. 1983); Spangler, 427




Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 27 [1991], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol27/iss1/5
BOARD OF EDUCATION v. DOWELL
adjustments to changing residential or attendance patterns even if they
result in resegregation."' 33
Regarding the necessity of future adjustments to accommodate such
demographic changes, the Court held in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education 34 that judicial intervention would only be appropri-
ate where school officials deliberately attempted to modify demographic
patterns to affect racial composition of the public schools.'35 Following
this rationale, the Court in Dowell indicated that residential segregation
resulting from private decision-making is "too attenuated to be a vestige
of former school segregation," and would not justify continuing the in-
junctive decree. 136
Justice Marshall, writing for the dissent, found a broader purpose in
desegregation injunctive decrees and emphatically asserted that the ma-
jority's reasoning failed to recognize the "threatened reemergence of one-
race schools as a relevant 'vestige' of dejure segregation."' 137 In the pres-
ence of such conditions which are apt to impose the "stigmatic injury"
denounced by Brown, the dissent argued that the purposes of the
mandatory injunction have not yet been achieved.' 38 Marshall's argu-
ment advocates a dissolution standard for desegregation injunctive de-
crees that considers the unique harm that racially identifiable schools
inflict upon black children whether or not the segregation was intention-
ally caused by state action.139  However, the dissent failed to acknowl-
edge the equally important interests of local governance and its limited
control over the remediation of constitutional violations. 140
The majority, in recognizing local autonomy and the limits of board
control, stated that "it is well established that school segregation 'may
have a profound reciprocal effect on the racial composition of residential
133. Donald E. Lively, Separate But Equak The Low Road Reconsidered, 14 HASTINGS CoNsT.
L.Q. 43, 65 (1986).
134. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
135. Id. at 31-32.
136. Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, Ill S. Ct. 630, 634-35 (1991).
137. Id. at 639 (quoting Swann, 402 U.S. at 15).
138. Id. (referring to Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
139. Id. at 641-42. While criticizing the majority for not addressing the scope or meaning of
"vestiges," Justice Marshall suggested that the "vestige" of state-imposed segregation includes all
conditions purporting to distinguish as inferior any particular class of persons. Id. at 644.
140. See id. at 647. "[TIhe majority risks subordination of the constitutional rights of Afro-
American children to the interest of school board autonomy. The courts must consider the value of
local control, but that factor primarily relates to the feasibility of a remedial measure . . . not
whether the constitutional violation has been remedied." Id. (citation omitted).
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neighborhoods.' "141 Thus, the school board is required by the majority
to only eliminate such effects to the most practicable extent within the
bounds of the board's authority.142 The board governs school operations
and has ultimate responsibility for any unfair ramifications caused by
past discriminatory policies. This responsibility calls for making a transi-
tion from the dual school system that evolved from the board's discrimi-
natory policy to a unitary system while under the supervisory control of
the judiciary. However, as the transition must inherently come to an end
after remedying the unconstitutional effects of discriminatory practices,
active judicial supervision must also cease since the remedial injunction
"may extend only as far as necessary to correct the proven [intentional]
violation." '43
If any effect is to be given to the finding of a unitary system, residen-
tial segregation existing after the achievement of unitary status cannot be
considered a vestige of previous state-imposed segregation since "uni-
tary" means that all traces of past discrimination have been remedied. In
order for the school board to be held liable for such subsequent residen-
tial segregation, established principles require proof of "post-unitary" in-
tentional, racially discriminatory conduct. No such showing was offered
in Dowell. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the
district court for a determination of whether all "vestiges of past discrim-
ination had been eliminated to the extent practicable.""
According to the analysis presented above, Oklahoma City's demo-
graphic conditions existing in 1985 could not be a vestige since unitary
status had previously been attained. Therefore, unless the unitary con-
cept is altered, the residential conditions must be deemed to be either a
vestige that has been remedied "to the extent practicable" or a result of
some other cause independent of the prior state-sanctioned segregation.
Any alternate conclusion requires a change in the definition of unitary
which was not contemplated by the majority or the dissenting opinion in
Dowell. Giving no new effect to a unitary finding, the Supreme Court
finally ended the controversy between the standards by addressing the
141. Id. at 646 (quoting Keyes v. School Dist., 413 U.S. 189, 202 (1973) and citing Columbus
Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 465 n.13 (1979)).
142. See Beard, supra note 8, at 1250. The author indirectly discusses the bounds of the board's
authority in stating that "[it would not serve the important objective of Brown I to seek to use
school desegregation cases for purposes beyond their scope." Id. The author espouses that this
limitation extends to all remedial measures not merely busing. Id. at 1250 n.51 (quoting Swann, 402
U.S. at 22).
143. Id. at 1301. See General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 399
(1982).
144. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 638.
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pivotal issue of whether a unitary finding entitles a school board to disso-
lution of a mandatory injunctive decree ending active judicial
involvement. 145
B. The Swift Standard and Its Inapplicability to Desegregation
The Supreme Court's resolution'" of the conflict between applicable
standards for the dissolution of a desegregation decree focused primarily
on comparing the standard used by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
in the latest Dowell opinion, the Swift standard, 47 to that applied in
Spangler v. Pasadena City Board of Education ' 4 and Riddick v. School
Board of Norfolk.'49
Comparing the Swift case to Dowell, the only analogous fact is that
in both cases an injunction was entered against the defendants who later
contested the operation of the decree. In contrast to the Dowell
mandatory decree, the Swift injunction was a consent decree entered in
1920 enjoining several meat-packing companies "from maintaining a mo-
* nopoly and from entering into or continuing any combination in restraint
of trade and commerce."' 5 By the very terms of the decree, the restric-
tions placed upon the defendant companies were to be effective in
perpetuity. 151
However, in 1930, the defendants decided that the restraints of the
injunction to which they had consented had become useless and oppres-
sive because of the changing conditions in their industry. 52 Thus, Swift
& Company, joined by other defendants, requested a modification of the
consent decree that addressed the new conditions.'53 Finding that the
reasons for the restraint were still present and that the decree did not
impose oppressive hardships upon the defendants, the Supreme Court
held that modification of the injunction was not warranted. 54 The Court
further stated that "[n]othing less than a clear showing of grievous wrong
evoked by new and unforeseen conditions should lead us to change what
145. Id. at 634-36.
146. Id. at 636-38.
147. See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932) and supra text accompanying
notes 90-91.
148. 611 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1979).
149. 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1986).
150. Swift, 286 U.S. at 111.
151. Id. See also Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 636-37.
152. Swift, 286 U.S. at 113.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 119-20.
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was decreed after years of litigation with the consent of all con-
cerned." 155 This is the Swift standard adhered to by the appellate court
and examined by the Supreme Court in Dowell.
The dissimilarities between the facts in Swift and those present in a
school desegregation case, such as Dowell, where a mandatory injunctive
decree is imposed upon school officials, are self-evident. Neither the
scope nor the purpose of the two decrees is comparable enough to justify
a general application of the same standard to both situations. After rem-
edying past transgressions, the school authorities should only need to
demonstrate their faithful and continual compliance with constitutional
demands. The Swift prerequisite of "grievous wrong evoked by new and
unforeseen conditions" gives a longer life to desegregation injunctive or-
ders than the existing principles of constitutional law will allow. 56
It follows that the strict Swift standard, which recognizes perpetual
injunctions as being a final judgment only modifiable or dissolvable under
extraordinary circumstances, should not be applicable to volatile areas of
the law such as public school desegregation. This rigorous standard
should apply only to situations similar to Swift where the remedy is
meant to be permanent and changes are not readily anticipated.
Additionally, since the Swift decree was consented to by all the par-
ties, the use of an inflexible standard appears more justifiable than in a
situation, such as Dowell, where the injunction takes the form of a
mandatory court order. Adjudicated discrimination cases that result in a
compulsory desegregation injunction require the court to balance state
and local interests in light of the remedy's objectives and the magnitude
of the constitutional violation.15 7
C. The Standard of Spangler and Riddick
Since both the Spangler and Riddick cases closely resemble Dowell,
as well as the majority of all desegregation cases, the Supreme Court's
adherence to the standards and rationales set forth in these opinions,
rather than Swift, is clearly merited. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
in Spangler held that the lower court had erred by refusing to lift its
155. Id. at 119.
156. The Swift standard condemns a school board to judicial tutelage for the indefinite future.
"Neither the principles governing the entry and dissolution of injunctive decrees, nor the commands
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, require any such Draconian result."
Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 638.
157. See Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 611 F.2d 1239, 1241 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing
Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977)).
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remedial order after substantial compliance had cured the effects of pre-
vious racial inequities.1"8 The court further declared that "(t]he displace-
ment of local government by a federal court is presumed to be
temporary" '159 and "[flurther delay in returning full responsibility for ad-
ministration to the school board is unjustified."'"
This holding is entirely consistent with principles established by the
Supreme Court in desegregation cases.161 For instance, the Court has
consistently held that "[t]he remedy ordered by a federal court to correct
racial segregation in a school system may not be more extensive than is
necessary to eliminate the effects of the constitutional violation that was
the predicate for the court's intervention."' 62 Accomplishing the objec-
tives of a court ordered remedy warrants the termination of judicial su-
pervision.163  Thus, pursuant to Spangler, the district court must
relinquish its continuing jurisdiction over public schools following the
school board's showing of faithful compliance with integration efforts.16
Compliance with the decree's objectives involves both remedying past
constitutional violations and intending to continue desegregation in the
future.
1 65
The Dowell court turned to a second case, Riddick,166 for the princi-,
ples regarding subsequent challenges to school boards that have previ-
ously complied with desegregation orders. 67 Under the principles of
Riddick, without new proof of discriminatory intent subsequent to the
correction of previous violations, further judicial intervention with re-
spect to student assignments constitutes the governmental establishment
of racial quotas.' 68  The Supreme Court has consistently condemned
158. Id. at 1241, 1244 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
159. Id at 1241.
160. Id. at 1244.
161. See, eg., Brennan v. Armstrong, 433 U.S. 672 (1977); School Dist. of Omaha v. United
States, 433 U.S. 667 (1977); Dayton Bd. of Edue. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977); Milliken v.
Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977); Austin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976); Keyes
v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S.
1, 31-32 (1971); Alexander v. Board of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969) (per curiam); Green v. County Sch.
Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Brown v. Board of Educ.,
349 U.S. 294 (1955); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
162. Spangler, 611 F.2d at 1242.
163. Id. (includes extensive list of Supreme Court cases that have espoused this principle).
164. Id. at 1241, 1247.
165. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976); Spangler, 611 F.2d at 1241.
166. 784 F.2d 521, 538 (1986).
167. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 635.
168. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 538.
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such judicial action where there are no unlawful circumstances to rem-
edy. 169 Reasoning that the achievement of unitary status effectively dis-
solves a mandatory desegregation injunction, the Riddick approach
deems any subsequent challenge to the school board's conduct to be a
prayer for new relief requiring a new showing of discriminatory intent on
behalf of the board. 7
This rationale is consistent with those principles comprising the
"unitary" concept which hold that the purpose of the remedy is satisfied
upon achieving unitariness in the public system. 17 1 Accordingly, with
nothing to remedy after achieving unitary status, the Swift burden of
proving "grievous wrong" evoked by a change in conditions was errone-
ously placed upon the board on remand, in order to justify dissolution of
the decree. The placement of this burden totally discounts the logical
ramifications of satisfying a desegregation decree. If a judgment has been
executed by implementing a mandatory injunction, "the judgment is sat-
isfied and must be vacated" once "the purposes of the litigation as incor-
torated in the decree.., have been fully achieved."' 172
V. CONCLUSION
The primary objectives of court ordered desegregation are the dis-
mantlement of racially identifiable schools and the creation of unitary
schools while concurrently respecting the decision-making independence
of local authorities.' Ultimately, these objectives may be fully achieved
only through the eradication of the existing "race-consciousness"
millennium.174
169. Id. (citing Spangler, 427 U.S. at 433-34; Milliken v. Bradley [Milliken I], 418 U.S. 717, 740-
41 (1974); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1971)).
170. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 525 (school board was no longer required to bus students after the
finding of unitariness). See L. Kevin Sheridan, Jr., Note, The Unitariness Finding and Its Effect on
Mandatory Desegregation Injunctions, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 551, 570 (citing Riddick, 784 F.2d at
536-37 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986)).
171. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 525 (upon becoming unitary and satisfying its duty to integrate, the
board disposes of all issues raised by the order). "[A] unitary kchool system is the goal of a school
desegregation remedy." Sheridan, supra note 170, at 554 n.II (citing the landmark desegregation
cases which established the principle that unitariness is the purpose of a remedial injunctive decree).
172. Beard, supra note 8, at 1267 (quoting Sierra Club v. Mason, 365 F. Supp. 47, 49 (D. Conn.
1973) and United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 248 (1968)).
173. See, eg., Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969) (per curiam).
174. See Lively, supra note 24, at 127-28 where the author criticizes modem school integration
policies because of their "race-sensitivity." Rather than focusing on the proposed concept of "color-
blindness," the implemented desegregation plans demand "attention to numbers, quotas, and formu-
las for effectuating racial balance." Id. at 127 n.93 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 27:85
24
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 27 [1991], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol27/iss1/5
BOARD OF EDUCATION v. DOWELL
Such racial distinctions must be displaced by a sincere "color-blind-
ness" inducing the birth of a new educational system consisting of "just
schools" rather than the "black" and "white" schools which are unjustly
designed to separately accommodate different races. 175 By expelling
these distinctions based on skin color alone, each individual's rights
would finally receive the unbiased equal protection guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Nevertheless,
the judicially forced creation of a unitary, unbiased educational system
may only be justified with respect to segregation caused by purposeful
discriminatory activities.
Following this reasoning, the Oklahoma City school board's faithful
and continuous compliance with the mandatory desegregation injunction
from 1972 until 1985 as to every facet of school operations calls for disso-
lution of the decree, provided that all vestiges of past intentional segrega-
tion have been eliminated to a practical extent. If all traces of the
previous constitutional violations are eradicated, judicial supervision
must cease, thus terminating jurisdiction and dissolving the decree.
Since the Dowell desegregation decree was designed to remedy inten-
tional racism, it would be an overreach of judicial power to allow this
injunction to also govern discriminatory conditions arising from uninten-
tional actions not contemplated in the formulation of the original decree.
Once a final judgment is entered, subsequent constitutional transgres-
sions should be remedied by new injunctive remedial measures. Thus,
without proof of subsequent violations, the school board's unbridled in-
dependence must be reinstated bringing an end to the possibility of per-
petual judicial supervision in the absence of intentional discrimination.
Gretchen M. Widdig
175. Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 442 (1968) (ordering school
boards failing to comply with the Brown decision to immediately convert to a public system "without
a 'white' school and a 'Negro' school, but just schools").
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